In the questions of the right to die, autonomy may be an important principle which calls our attention to the dignity of individuals and the justice and respect that are owed to them, but it is not the only germane principle in end of life choices. Death may be viewed as evil in many Judeo-Christian religions, where it is seen that all forms of life should be preserved, but on questioning end of life decisions, the most pressing question is “not how long we live, but how we live” (Wadell, 2007). This approach to the right to die is a variant of the individual’s autonomy, and is seen as the individual’s feeling they have led a happy life, and their own functionality and happiness is diminishing. Yet, even if the right to die is confined to these standards, opponents have pin-pointed the problem of determining how high or low a standard of an individual’s well-being is acceptable, and using the Nazi’s euthanasia program and comparisons to bolster their account (Macklin, 2001). Many advocates of pro-life have stated when the ethic regarding “sanctity of human life is proven indefensible at both the beginning and end of life, a new ethic will replace it. It will recognize […] the concept of a person is distinct from that of a member of the species of Homo sapiens, and that it is personhood, not species membership, that is most significant in determining when it is wrong to end a life” (Singer, 2005).
In response to this criticism, the advocates of the right to die have said “a coherent” quality of life position is “grounded in a theory of the value of humans as beings with a capacity for self-reflective deliberation and action. It explicates the meaning of ‘quality of life’ of human beings in terms of standards of individual well-being, rather than in terms of social worth,” unlike the Nazis (Macklin, 2001). But adding this to the argument did nothing to sway my opinion on the matter, and in fact, raised the question about those who did not have the capacity for self-reflection and deliberation. For example, those patients in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) or who are mentally handicapped cannot do so, and there is now a debate in whether or not a comatose person can feel pain. Overall, in this view, I found that this argument would tend to label whose life matters and whose does not.
Furthermore, I found the Catholic Church takes a similar stance on this issue. In the Catechism of the Catholic Church (1997), it states:
Whatever its motives and means, direct euthanasia consists in putting an end to the lives of handicapped, sick, or dying persons. It is morally unacceptable. Thus an act or omission which, of itself or by intention, causes death in order to eliminate suffering constitutes a murder gravely contrary to the dignity of the human person and to the respect due to the living God, his Creator.
In this argument, I found that our choices are not private, because we are accountable to God and that all of us are enmeshed in communities and relationships with others which create moral bonds and responsibilities that are easily blurred if we act on autonomy alone.
On the contrary, even though the Church is against euthanasia, it views death as an imminent part of life, and humans should resist “playing God.” The emphasis of patient autonomy in contemporary thinking has brought about another science-based medical defect, which James Bresnahan (1995) notes as “our near obsession with finding a medical ‘quick fix’ for all problems.” In Bresnahan’s (1995) article, he contends, “Our Catholic medical ethics urges a counter-cultural response to fears of both too little and too much medical intervention, [… called] ‘Catholic medical pacifism.’” Our cure-oriented medical interventions all too often prolong dying. The Church believes that discontinuing medical procedures that are “burdensome, dangerous, extraordinary, or disproportionate to the expected outcome are legitimate,” because it will not cause death; instead, it recognizes the individual’s inability to inhibit it (Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1997).
In end of life issues, individuals suffering can see their happiness and quality of life diminishing, and the overemphasis of autonomy can lead us into dangerous and worrisome ways. Judging whose life is worth living and whose is not can direct us to constrict life to those viewed as “the worthy.” In fact, this issue can go both ways, with those who try to deny our mortality. In Bresnahan’s (1995) article, he calls this “mortal vitalism,” where one does everything medically to ward off death, even if it needlessly afflicts a dying patient. Bresnahan (1995) attempts to solve this, answering, “We ponder our limits and seek to learn to accept and deal with them. We come to terms with living within the limits, the limits imposed by mortality and by the two-edged sword of high technology medical intervention.” Medicine, science, and technology may give us ways to prolong our lives, but they ought not be worshipped. Instead our overriding concern should not be how medical technology might one day enable us to conquer death, but ‘How should I want to live in order that I may die well’” (Wadell, 2007)?
References
-Bresnahan, J. F. (1995, November 4). The Catholic Art of Dying. America, 11, 12-16.
-Bresnahan, J. F. (1995, November 4). The Catholic Art of Dying. America, 11, 12-16.
-Catechism of the Catholic Church (2nd ed.). (1997). New York, NY: Doubleday.
-Macklin, Ruth (2001). Which Way Down the Slippery Slope? Nazi Medical Killing and Euthanasia Today. In J. Harris (Ed.), Bioethics (pp. 109-130). New York: Oxford University Press.
-Singer, P. (2005). The Sanctity of Life. Foreign Policy, pp. 40-41.
-Wadell, P.J. (2007). Happiness and the Christian Moral Life. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
--Jennifer W.